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Anastasia Gorodzeisky

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Anastasia Gorodzeisky

Juan March Institute, Spain

Abstract

This article suggests that the economic standing of foreigners' country of origin may become grounds for the emergence of an inclination to exclude an out-group population from the country. Moreover, exclusionary attitudes based on the economic standing of the immigrant's country of origin may vary according to the economic conditions of the destination country. Data obtained from European Social Survey for 21 countries show that exclusionary views directed exclusively at foreigners from 'poorer countries in Europe' or at foreigners 'from richer countries in Europe' are quite substantial. Multi-level analyses reveal that differential preferences of immigrants from relatively rich and poor European countries indeed interact with the economic conditions of the host societies. Support for the exclusion of European foreigners from 'poorer countries' tends to be less pronounced in economically prosperous places while support for exclusion of European foreigners from 'richer countries' tends to be less pronounced in economically depressed places. The findings are discussed in the light of sociological literature and the context of modern European society.

Keywords

cross-national analysis, Europe, exclusionary attitudes, immigration

Introduction

The body of research on anti-immigrant sentiments, negative views, hostility and public support for implementation of exclusionary practices toward out-group populations in European societies has grown rapidly over the two last decades and has become substantial (Coenders, 2001; Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009; Kunovich, 2004; Quillian, 1995; Pettigrew, 1998; Scheepers et al., 2002; Semyonov et al., 2006, 2008). At the same time, most studies on the topic have not distinguished conceptually between public support for exclusion and other forms of hostility towards foreigners and have unfortunately used the terms prejudice, discriminatory attitudes, hostility, anti-foreigner sentiment and exclusionary views interchangeably. In contrast, this article, following the argument developed by Gorodzeisky and Semyonov (2009), treats 'support for exclusion' as a concept that is distinct from other forms of hostility. The article focuses on

Corresponding author:

Anastasia Gorodzeisky, CEACS, Juan March Institute, Calle Castello, 77, Madrid 28006, Spain

Email: agorodzeisky@ceacs.march.es

public support for ‘exclusion of foreigners from social system’, or, in terms of the ethnic antagonism theory (Bonacich, 1972), ‘exclusion movement’ – a strategy that constitutes attempts and efforts by majority group members to prevent the physical presence of out-groups in the country.

In this article I suggest that the economic standing of foreigners’ country of origin may become a ground (or criteria) for the emergence of an inclination to exclude an out-group population from the country. I further argue that exclusionary attitudes based on the immigrant’s country of origin economic standing may vary according to the economic conditions of the destination country. Thus, in the analysis presented in the article I use data obtained from the European Social Survey for 21 European countries to provide answers to the two following questions. First, are Europeans more likely to exclude European immigrants from relatively poor countries, rather than from relatively rich countries or vice versa? Second, to what extent are attitudes toward admission/exclusion on the basis of immigrant’s country of origin economic standing influenced by individual-level and country-level characteristics, and in particular, by the economic position of the host country? Studying attitudes solely towards European immigrants provides a unique opportunity to remove the issue of race (and to some extent the issue of ethnicity) while allowing exploration of the relationship between exclusionary attitudes towards foreigners and economic standing of their country of origin. Thus, the article examines to a large extent attitudes toward immigration and immigration policies within the European context and net of racial attitudes.

In what follows, first, I draw my hypothesis from theoretical considerations and previous research on the topic; second, I describe the data and variables; third, I present a descriptive overview of the data and estimate a series of bi-level logistic regressions to examine the effect of individual- and country-level characteristics on the different categories of support for exclusion; and fourth, I discuss the findings in the light of sociological literature and the context of modern European society.

Theoretical considerations and previous research

The ‘competitive threat’ theoretical model suggests that exclusionary attitudes and hostility towards foreign populations are a result of fear of competition and perceived threats posed by the out-group population to the interests of the in-group population in social and economic arenas, and, especially, in the labor market (e.g. Blalock, 1967; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009; Quillian, 1995; Olzak, 1992; Semyonov et al., 2002). Immigrants from relatively rich countries are more likely to be perceived *at the collective level* as a source of economic competition with members of the majority population in the labor market, than immigrants from relatively poor countries. The former group of immigrants is likely to have skills and human capital resources that are similar to the local population, and they are therefore, in a better position to compete over high skilled, professional and well-paid jobs. In contrast, immigrants from relatively poor countries are less likely to have the skills, human capital and economic resources needed for high-status jobs and lucrative occupations. Therefore, they usually take menial low-paying jobs that natives are not willing to perform (King, 1997; Semyonov and Gorodzeisky, 2004; Stalker, 1994). Thus, they are less likely to compete with the local population over high-status and desirable positions.

Following the logic embodied in the ‘competitive threat’ theoretical model I would expect more support for the exclusion of immigrants from relatively rich European countries than for immigrants from relatively poor European countries. However, I expect support for the exclusion of immigrants from rich and poor countries to vary on the basis of the economic conditions of the country of destination. Previous studies have revealed that, in general, opposition to immigration is influenced by economic conditions in the host country – opposition and negative views are more

pronounced in depressed economies than in prosperous economies (e.g. Blalock, 1967; Coenders et al., 2004; Kunovich, 2004; Semyonov et al., 2006). In comparison to immigrants from poor countries, immigrants from relatively rich countries are more likely to be viewed as having appropriate human capital attributes, educational skills and economic resources that are suitable more for the economy of the host country. Likewise, they are less likely to be viewed as a cause of crime and delinquency and as abusers and exploiters of the welfare system. Therefore, according to this logic, it is reasonable to expect greater support for the admission of immigrants from relatively rich countries and greater objection to the admission of immigrants from relatively poor countries, especially in host countries that are not economically prosperous.

Indeed, differential preferences of immigrants from relatively rich and poor European countries can interact with the characteristics of host countries and become rather complicated in the light of findings that demonstrate that out-group populations are often viewed as a threat to the interests of the in-group population, not only in the labor market but also to security, the welfare system, the housing market, and education (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Faist, 1994; Rajzman et al., 2003; Scheepers et al., 2002). Therefore, arguments on preferences of immigrants from rich and poor European countries might be driven for both directions, in a part, due to the differences in the economic standing of host countries. The present article attempts to examine the differential preferences of immigrants from relatively rich and poor countries by examining both the level and the sources of attitudes towards the admission/exclusion of immigrants from European countries.

The exclusive focus on exclusionary attitudes towards European immigrants allows us to reduce heterogeneity among out-group populations in terms of race, ethnicity and cultural distance from majority members of host societies, which, in turn, reduces to some extent any inter-correlation between the geo-cultural dimension and economic standing of country of origin. At the same time, the study of attitudes towards European immigrants allows us to examine exclusionary attitudes towards the principal group of foreigners in Europe. At the beginning of the 21st century in most European countries (included in the study) the majority of foreigners were Europeans from another country (Salt, 2005), with few exceptions. In Spain, Finland and the UK, the number of European immigrants as a proportion of the total foreign population was slightly under half, around 45 percent. In Ireland and Portugal, European immigrants comprised 39 and 30 percent of the total foreign population respectively.¹ It is worth noting that 17 out of the 21 countries included in the study were EU member countries at the time of the ESS data collection process (2002). As for the remaining four countries, although they were not members of the EU in 2002, their accession was in very advanced stages. The analysis, thus, examines the effect of individual-level and structural-level attributes on exclusionary attitudes towards the largest group of immigrants in Europe, namely, immigrants from economically prosperous countries in Europe, as well as immigrants from economically depressed countries in Europe, across 21 European societies.

Data and variables

The data for the present analysis were obtained from the first round of the European Social Survey (ESS) that took place in 2002. Twenty-one European countries participated in this round of the ESS, and in each of these countries information was gathered from a random probability national sample. The analysis reported here was restricted to citizens over the age of 18. For the purpose of the present analysis I selected a series of individual-level socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, plus a series of questions pertaining to respondents' support for exclusion of different European foreign populations from a society. To these variables I added from secondary sources two country-level characteristics to capture contextual-structure attributes of host countries.

The individual-level socio-demographic characteristics of respondents in this study are those traditionally used as predictors of attitudes toward out-group populations (see Dustmann, 2000; Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996; Esses et al., 2001; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009; Semyonov et al., 2004). They include: age (in years), gender (men = 1), marital status (married = 1), education (in formal years of schooling), employment status (unemployed = 1), occupational status (blue-collar occupations = 1), political orientation (left to right scale of 10 ordinal categories), rural versus urban residence (rural = 1). For a detailed list of the variables and their definition see Appendix Table 1.

In addition, the analysis includes two contextual country-level variables: size of the foreign population and GDP per capita. These two contextual variables have long been viewed by social scientists as the main structural indicators of competitive threat (e.g. Coenders, 2001; Coenders et al., 2004; Lahav, 2004; Quillian, 1995; Scheepers et al., 2002; Semyonov et al., 2008). GDP per capita is averaged for the years 2000–2002 and used as an indicator of economic conditions of a host country. Average percentage of foreigners living in every country in 2000, 2001 and 2002 is used as a measured indicator of the actual size of the foreign population. The values of country-level variables and sample size for each country are displayed in Appendix Table 2.

The dependent variable – attitudes towards exclusion/admission of immigrants from relatively poor and rich European countries – was constructed by respondents' answers to the following two questions: 'To what extent do you think (country) should allow people from *richer countries in Europe* to come and live here?' and 'To what extent do you think (country) should allow people from *poorer countries in Europe* to come and live here?' (see Appendix Table 1 for scale of responses and coding information). The dependent variable distinguishes between four categories of host country citizens, according to their views on exclusion/admission of European immigrants from the country: 1) respondents who support exclusion of all European foreigners, both foreigners from 'richer' and 'poorer countries in Europe' (hereafter, *total exclusionists*); 2) respondents who support inclusion of foreigners from 'richer countries in Europe' but object to the inclusion of foreigners from 'poorer countries in Europe' (hereafter, *poor country exclusionists*); 3) respondents who support inclusion of foreigners from 'poorer country in Europe' but object to the inclusion of foreigners from 'richer countries in Europe' (hereafter, *rich country exclusionists*); and 4) those who support inclusion of all European foreigners, both foreigners from 'poorer' as well as from 'richer countries in Europe' (hereafter, *pro-admission*).

Analysis and findings

Descriptive overview

Table 1 displays a distribution of Europeans across the four categories of support for exclusion on the basis of an immigrant's country of origin economic standing, by economic condition of host country. I divided 21 host European countries into three groups, based on their economic standing. Relatively rich (wealthy) countries with GDP per capita more than \$20,000; middle-range countries with GDP between \$11,000 and \$20,000; and relatively poor countries with GDP per capita of \$10,000 and less.

The data displayed in Table 1 reveal that, in general, slightly less than half of the European population is pro-admission. A third of Europeans object to admission of any European foreigners (regardless of the economic standing of foreigners' country of origin) and are classified as 'total exclusionists'. The proportion of 'total exclusionists' is slightly higher in middle-range and relatively poor countries (around 36% and 33.7% respectively) than in rich countries (30.7%).

Table 1. Distribution of Europeans across four categories of support for exclusion of European immigrants, by economic standing of destination region (%), *N* = 34,589

	Pro-admission	Total exclusionists	Poor countries exclusionists	Rich countries exclusionists
Relatively rich European countries (GDP per capita more than \$20,000)	48.2	30.7	10.9	10.3
Middle-range European countries (GDP per capita from \$11,000 to \$20,000)	47.5	36.0	10.6	5.9
Relatively poor European countries (GDP per capita to \$10,000)	45.4	33.7	15.9	4.9
Total	47.6	32.5	11.5	8.4

About 11 percent of rich and middle-range European countries' citizens are classified as 'poor country exclusionists'. Those respondents are willing to admit foreigners from 'richer countries in Europe' but object to the admission of foreigners from 'poorer countries'. The proportion of 'poor country exclusionists' is higher in relatively poor European host societies where it reaches almost 16 percent. By contrast, the proportion of 'rich country exclusionists' is very low in poor host societies. Only 4.9 percent of the respondents in relatively poor countries in Europe object to the admission of foreigners from 'richer countries in Europe', but support admission of foreigners from 'poorer countries'. And only 5.9 percent of the respondents in middle-range countries are classified as 'rich country exclusionists'. The proportion of 'rich country exclusionists' is highest (10.3%) in relatively rich host countries, and is equal to the proportion of 'poor country exclusionists' in these countries.

For illustrative purpose, Figure 1 shows the distribution of Europeans across the four categories of support for exclusion by country. The countries are placed in ascending order of GDP, from the country that has the lowest GDP (Poland) to the country that has the highest GDP (Luxembourg). The data clearly show that the poorest countries in Europe (Eastern European countries with GDP per capita of \$10,000 and less) prefer foreigners from relatively rich countries. For example, while 15 percent of Hungarians and 17 percent of Czechs object to the admission of European foreigners from 'poorer countries'; only about 3 percent of Hungarians and 5 percent of Czechs object to the admission of European foreigners from 'richer countries'. The pattern in the middle-range countries (GDP per capita from \$11,000 to \$20,000), such as Spain, Greece and Portugal, was found to be quite similar to the pattern of the poorest countries. However, in the middle-range countries the differences between the level of support for exclusion of foreigners from 'richer countries' and the level of support for exclusion of foreigners from 'poorer countries' are smaller, especially in Italy.

In rich European countries (Northern and Western European countries with GDP per capita more than \$20,000), the picture is different. There is no meaningful difference between the percentage of 'rich country exclusionists' and the percentage of 'poor country exclusionists' in most wealthy Northern and Western European countries (for example Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg). In some countries, like the Netherlands and Switzerland, more citizens object to the admission of foreigners from 'richer countries in Europe' than from 'poorer countries'. The only exception is Denmark where the proportion of poor country exclusionists is substantially higher than the proportion of rich country exclusionists.




Figure 1. Distribution of Europeans across four categories of support for exclusion of European immigrants (%).

To summarize, the data reveal meaningful differences between citizens of relatively rich host countries (e.g. Northern and Western European countries) and citizens of relatively poor host countries (e.g. Southern and Eastern European countries) in their views toward exclusion/admission of immigrants from poorer and richer countries in Europe. Indeed, the descriptive findings are in line with the hypothesis that the effect of economic standing of foreigners’ country of origin on exclusionary views is influenced by the economic conditions in the host country.

Multivariate analysis

Although interesting and informative, the descriptive data cannot tell us whether the variation across countries in support for exclusion that is based on the economic standing of foreigners’ country of origin is due to cross-national differences in the socioeconomic composition of the populations or due to differences in the structural characteristics of the host countries, in particular, economic conditions (GDP). In order to examine the extent to which structural-level and individual-level characteristics affect support for different types of ‘exclusion’, I estimated a series of hierarchical logistic models. This is a statistical procedure that allows the estimation of country-level effects while variations in individual level characteristics are controlled (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992).

In Table 2, I present three bi-level regression equations predicting the odds of becoming a member of a specific exclusionist group as a function of individual-level characteristics plus GDP, and size of the foreign population at the country-level.² The slopes of education and left-right political orientation are allowed to vary across countries. Previous research has shown that effect of education

Table 2. Logistic regressions coefficients predicting odds of becoming total exclusionist (versus pro-admission), poor country exclusionist (versus pro-admission) and rich country exclusionist (versus pro-admission) on individual-level and country-level variables: 21 countries in second level

	Total exclusionists versus pro-admission 1	Poor country exclusionists versus pro-admission 2	Rich country exclusionists versus pro-admission 3
<i>Intercept</i>	-0.56*	-1.59*	-1.74*
Individual-level variables ^a and <i>interaction terms</i>			
Men	-0.24* (0.04)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.48* (0.07)
Married	0.02 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.07)
Rural	0.08 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.07 (0.07)
Age	0.007* (0.002)	0.008* (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)
Unemployed	0.38* (0.15)	0.34* (0.13)	-0.01 (0.12)
Blue-collar occupations	0.47* (0.08)	0.22* (0.02)	0.38* (0.09)
Education	-0.12* (0.01)	-0.09* (0.02)	-0.10* (0.01)
<i>Education x GDP*1000</i>	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)
Left-right orientation	0.11* (0.02)	0.18* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
<i>Left-right orientation x GDP*1000</i>	0.005* (0.002)	0.01* (0.001)	-0.0003 (0.002)
Country-level variables ^b			
Percentage of foreigners	0.04 (0.06)	0.05 (0.03)	0.001 (0.01)
GDP*1000	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.06* (0.02)	0.02* (0.006)
Variance component ^c			
Country-level random effects – u_0	0.51	0.22	0.03

^aThe slopes of gender, married, rural, age, unemployed and blue-collar occupation variables are constrained to be identical across 21 countries. Age has been centered around their grand means. Dummy variables are uncentered. The slopes of education and political orientation variables have been allowed to vary across countries. Education and political orientation have been centered around group means. Country means of these variables have been returned at country-level equations (the coefficients are not presented)

^bThe level-2 predictors have been centered around their grand mean.

^cThe variance component for the fully unconditional model at country level are: 0.39 (for equation 1), 0.23 (for equation 2) and 0.1 (for equation 3).

* $p < 0.05$.

and left-right political orientation tend to vary across countries (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009; Kunovich, 2004; Semyonov et al., 2006). The interaction terms between these individual-level variables and country level variable – GDP per capita – have been introduced to the equations as an attempt to explain the variation in the effect of education and political orientation across countries. In equation 1, I estimate the odds of belonging to the ‘total exclusionists’ category versus the ‘Pro-admission’ category. In equation 2, I estimate the odds of belonging to the ‘poor country exclusionists’ category versus ‘Pro-admission’ and in equation 3 I estimate the odds of belonging to the ‘poor country exclusionists’ category versus ‘Pro-admission’.³ In what follows, I first discuss the effect of main individual-level and country-level variables in all three equations and then discuss the effects of the interaction terms.

The results displayed in equation 1 (Table 2) show that the odds of supporting exclusion of all foreigners (total exclusionists) versus supporting the admittance of them all, at individual level, tend to increase with age and right wing political orientation, and to decrease with education. Also, the odds of becoming ‘total exclusionists’ tend to be higher among women, the unemployed and those who hold blue-collar occupations. In contrast, neither place of residence nor marital status

exerts a significant effect on 'total exclusionism'. Not surprisingly and in a line with previous research (Castles and Miller, 1993; Dustmann, 2000; Esses et al., 2001; Fetzer, 2000; Raijman et al., 2003; Schnapper, 1994; Semyonov et al., 2004), support for 'total exclusionism' tends to be more pronounced among conservative (older and those holding a right-wing political ideology) and socio-economically weak populations. At the country-structural level, neither size of foreign population nor GDP exerts a significant effect on support for total exclusionism.

Equations 2 and 3 predict the relative odds of becoming a 'poor country exclusionist' or a 'rich country exclusionist' – in other words, to support exclusion on the basis of foreigners' country of origin economic standing. The results displayed in columns 2 and 3 (Table 2) reveal both similarities and differences in the way individual-level variables affect the two categories of exclusion (i.e. exclusion of foreigners from 'poorer European countries' and exclusion of foreigners from 'richer European countries'). The effects of marital status, place of residence, education and blue-collar occupations are similar. However, the effect of gender, age, employment status, and political orientation are different. Specifically, well-educated people and those who hold white-collar occupations are less likely to support exclusion of European foreigners from 'poorer countries' of origin, as well as European foreigners from 'richer countries' of origin. Neither place of residence nor marital status exerts a significant effect on the odds of becoming either a poor country exclusionist or a rich country exclusionist.

Men are more supportive of admitting foreigners from 'richer countries', but do not differ from women in their exclusionary views toward foreigners from 'poorer countries' of origin. More specifically, the effect of gender on the odds of supporting 'rich country exclusionism' is $b = -0.48$, implying that the odds that men would become 'rich country exclusionists' are 0.62 times lower than that of women.

Unemployed people (who are economically more vulnerable), by contrast, are more supportive of the exclusion of foreigners from 'poorer countries', but do not differ in their views toward foreigners from 'richer countries'. The odds of unemployed people becoming poor country exclusionists are 1.41 times greater than those who are employed or out of the active labor force ($b = 0.34$). Age and right-wing political orientation also increases the odds of belonging to the 'poor country exclusionists' category, but neither of these variables exerts a significant effect on support for exclusion of foreigners from relatively rich countries. Apparently, the exclusionary views of the conservative population (older and those holding a right-wing political ideology) are influenced by the economic standing of foreigners' country of origin. Indeed, while a right-wing political ideology plays a role in the endorsement of exclusionary attitudes that are directed exclusively at foreigners from 'poorer countries in Europe', it does not exert any effect on exclusionary views that are directed exclusively at foreigners from 'richer countries in Europe'.

At the country-structural level, the size of the foreign population neither exerts a significant effect on the odds of becoming a poor country exclusionist nor on the odds of becoming a rich country exclusionist. By contrast, the economic conditions in the host country (as measured by GDP per capita) do affect the odds of becoming a poor country exclusionist as well as the odds of becoming a rich country exclusionist. Moreover, the effect of GDP on the two categories of exclusion that are based on the economic standing of foreigners' country of origin has the opposite direction. The negative coefficient of GDP in equation 2 implies that support for exclusion of European foreigners from 'poorer countries' tends to be less pronounced in economically prosperous places. However, the positive coefficient of GDP in equation 3 implies that support for exclusion of European foreigners from 'richer countries' of origin tends to be more pronounced in economically prosperous places or tends to be less pronounced in economically depressed places. These findings support the hypothesis that the differential preferences of immigrants from relatively rich and poor countries of origin interact with the economic standing of host societies. Citizens of economically

prosperous countries are more likely to object to the admission of foreigners from 'richer countries in Europe'. At the same time, citizens of less wealthy countries are more likely to object to the admission of immigrants from 'poorer countries in Europe'.

The models presented in Table 2 also include interaction terms between education and GDP and between political orientation and GDP. The goal for introducing the interaction terms is to capture the extent to which impact of these two individual-level variables (education and political orientation) on exclusionary views vary by economic conditions of host countries. The insignificant interaction terms between education and GDP in all three models imply that relations between education and all types of exclusion (total exclusionism, poor country exclusionism and rich country exclusionism) do not vary by the economic conditions of host countries. The interaction terms between political orientation and GDP in equations 1 and 2 were found to be both positive and significant. This implies that the impact of political ideology on the odds of becoming total exclusionists and on the odds of becoming poor country exclusionists is higher among economically prosperous countries than among economically depressed societies. Figure 2 displays the effect of political ideology on the odds of supporting exclusion of foreigners from 'poorer countries in Europe' for averaged lower and upper quartiles of GDP. The figure illustrates that the views toward exclusion/admission of European foreigners from 'poorer countries' among citizens holding different political ideologies are more polarized in wealthier countries.

Discussion and conclusion

In the present article I suggest that the inclination to exclude or to admit foreigners to a society can be formed on the basis of a foreigners' country of origin economic standing. Thus, a host country's population may prefer to exclude foreigners from relatively rich countries of origin than foreigners from relatively poor countries or vice versa. I further suggest that these differential preferences of foreigners from rich and poor countries of origin can interact with the economic conditions in the host country. This article has focused exclusively on attitudes toward European immigrants, thus,




Figure 2. The effect of political orientation on the odds of becoming a poor country exclusionist.

it provides a unique opportunity to examine to a large extent attitudes toward immigration and immigration policies in Europe net of racial attitudes.

The analysis shows that although exclusionary views on the basis of a foreigner's country of origin economic standing are less widespread than general exclusionary views, the former attitudes are quite substantial. Thus, exclusionary views of a third of Europeans are directed 'indiscriminately' to all European foreigners⁴ (regardless of their country of origin economic standing), while the exclusionary views of 12 percent of Europeans are directed exclusively at foreigners from 'poorer countries in Europe', and exclusionary attitudes of 8 percent of Europeans are directed exclusively at foreigners 'from richer countries in Europe'.

There are both similarities and differences in the ways individual level variables affect the two categories of exclusion that are formed on the basis of foreigners' country of origin economic standing (i.e. exclusion of European foreigners from relatively rich countries and exclusion of European foreigners from relatively poor countries). For example, less educated people are likely to support both categories of exclusion. In contrast, conservative populations (older people and those holding right-wing political ideologies) are likely to support exclusion of European foreigners from 'poorer countries of origin', but do not differ from younger people and those holding left-wing political ideologies in their attitudes toward exclusion of European foreigners from 'richer countries' of origin. These findings are quite interesting and counter-intuitive in the light of argument that conservative views promote anti-foreigner sentiments and lead to exclusionary attitudes since they are strongly associated with the sense of cultural threat posed by foreigners on the national traditions, values and identity of a society (Baumgartl and Favell, 1995; Castles and Miller, 1993; Rajzman, 2010; Wimmer, 1997). According to this argument one would expect the effect of a right-wing political ideology on support for exclusion of foreigners from poorer and richer European countries to be identical, or in other words, 'blind' towards the economic standing of a European immigrant's country of origin. However, the results clearly show that the economic standing of foreigners' country of origin serve as criteria for the endorsement of exclusionary attitudes among the conservative population. The analysis also reveals that the effect of right-wing political orientation on support for exclusion of foreigners from 'poorer countries in Europe' is more pronounced in economically prosperous places.

At the country-level, support for the admission of foreigners exclusively from 'poorer countries in Europe' tends to increase with the economic prosperity of the host society (as measured by GDP), net of socio-demographic attributes of individuals, including their position in the labor market. In contrast, support for the admission of foreigners exclusively from 'richer countries in Europe' tends to decrease with economic prosperity in host societies. That is, differential preferences of immigrants from relatively rich and poor European countries indeed interact with the economic conditions of the host societies. As was suggested in the theoretical part of this article, it seems that Europeans from relatively wealthy countries prefer foreigners from relatively poor countries since these foreigners are less likely to be perceived *at the collective level* as a source of economic competition in the labor market and more likely to take jobs that natives are not willing to perform. Europeans from relatively poor countries may prefer foreigners from relatively rich countries since they are less likely to be viewed as a burden on the welfare system of the host society and more likely to be viewed as contributing to the development of the host economy. One possible alternative explanation for the high level of support for admission of foreigners from 'richer countries in Europe' among citizens of the poorest European countries, namely Eastern European countries, may lie in their motivation to become EU members. The inclination of Hungarian, Czech and Polish citizens to admit foreigners from 'richer countries in Europe' expressed in 2002 may reflect their willingness to become part of EU. However this explanation is not applicable for other relatively poor countries in Europe, such as Greece, Portugal, and Italy.

While economic conditions in a host country exert a significant effect on support for ‘poor country exclusionism’ and ‘rich country exclusionism’, the economic conditions do not exert a significant effect on support for ‘total exclusionism’ (regardless of foreigners’ country of origin economic standing). These findings may provide a clue for explaining why empirical studies on the effect of economic conditions on discriminatory attitudes toward foreigners or immigrants have not produced consistent findings and conclusions (for more detailed discussion, see Semyonov et al., 2008). On the basis of the results presented in this article, it is reasonable to suggest that economic conditions in the host country may exert a differential effect on exclusionary views toward different groups of foreigners.

Although beyond the scope of this study, there are additional (to economic standing and actual size of foreign population) possible macro-level explanations for anti-foreigner sentiment, such as different media coverage effects across countries (Allport, 1979; Blumer, 1958), country-level variation in popularity of extreme right-wing parties (Semyonov et al., 2006; Wilkes et al., 2007) or inter-group contact effects at regional-level (Schlueter and Wagner, 2008). These structural level characteristics of host places may also exert an impact on exclusionary views on the basis of a foreigner’s country of origin economic standing.

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Appendix

Appendix Table I. Definition for the individual-level and country-level variables included in the analysis

Individual-level variables	Definition
Gender	Men = 1 (%)
Age	In years
Marital status	Married = 1 (%)
Education	In years
Left-right orientation	‘How would you place your views on this scale?’ Measured on scale: 0= left, 10 = right
Occupational status	Blue-collar occupation = 1
Unemployed	Unemployed = 1
Rural versus urban residence	Rural = 1 (%)
	Definitions and exact wording of items that were used to construct dependent variables
Type of exclusion	‘To what extent do you think [country] should allow people from richer countries in Europe to come and live here?’ ‘To what extent do you think [country] should allow people from poorer countries in Europe to come and live here?’ Responses ‘many’ and ‘some’ were coded as support for admission; responses ‘a few’ and ‘non’ were coded as support for exclusion.
Country-level variables	
Size of foreign population ^a	Mean of percentage of foreigners (non-citizens) in 2000, 2001 and 2002
GDP per capita ^b	RGDPL: Real gross domestic product per capita (constant price: Laspeyers), unit \$, Mean of 2000, 2001, 2002

^aSource: OECD.

^bSource: Heston et al. (2002).

Appendix Table 2. Sample size and values for country-level variables included in the analysis

	Sample size	Percent of foreign population	GDP per capita in \$US
Austria	2096	8.87	24,255
Belgium	1648	8.27	22,702
Czech Republic	1311	2.13	5804
Denmark	1419	4.93	30,521
Finland	1862	1.90	23,972
France	1401	5.60	22,861
Germany	2638	8.90	23,104
Greece	2359	4.60	11,389
Hungary	1607	1.10	5408
Ireland	1889	4.37	27,450
Italy	1164	2.47	19,359
Luxembourg	944	37.27	45,698
Netherlands	2258	4.27	24,377
Norway	1949	4.20	38,919
Poland	1961	0.10	4645
Portugal	1414	2.15	11,097
Slovenia	1443	2.15	10,197
Spain	1612	2.70	14,712
Sweden	1852	5.37	26,211
Switzerland	1761	19.63	34,709
UK	1936	4.23	25,026

Notes

1. There is also meaningful variation in the composition of European foreign population across host countries in Europe. For example, in 2000, in Luxembourg, Ireland, and Belgium, over half of the foreign population came from other EU-15 countries; in Spain, the UK, France and Sweden between a third and a half; and in Hungary about 10 percent of the foreign population came from EU-15 countries (Juhász, 2003; Salt, 2005). Yet despite variations in the country of origin, the ‘foreigners’ are considered outsiders in their host societies. For example, McLaren (2001) found that the vast majority of EU citizens view internal and external migration – even in terms of the EU-15 – as identical. From a theoretical point of view, thus, all European foreigners can be viewed as out-group populations and as such they often become a target for discriminatory attitudes (e.g. Pettigrew, 1998; Semyonov et al., 2006).
2. I repeated the analysis with two alternative measured indicators of the actual size of the foreign population: ‘proportion of non-EU foreigners’ and ‘proportion of EU foreigners’, and also with both indicators together as separate variables. The results were found to be similar to the models, including the proportion of the whole foreign population as a measured indicator of the actual size of the foreign population.
3. I am aware that most appropriate strategy to examine the odds of belonging to each one of the four exclusionists’ categories is to estimate multinomial bi-level regression instead of a series of logistic bi-level regressions. Unfortunately, the limitation of the data (in particular, relatively small numbers of country-level units), does not allow estimating stable multinomial model with robust standard errors while allowing the slopes of relevant individual level variables to vary across countries. Thus, I decided to estimate a series of logistic bi-level regressions. To test the robustness of the results I estimated multinomial bi-level regression constraining all individual level slopes to be identical across the countries as well as multinomial regression, including fixed effects for countries. No meaningful differences in the results were found.
4. It is interesting to note that this figure is very similar to the proportion of Europeans who object to the admission of any foreigners regardless of their race and ethnic background (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009).

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